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INFORMATION OVERLOAD, MULTI-TASKING, AND THE SOCIALLY
NETWORKED JURY: WHY PROSECUTORS SHOULD APPROACH THE
MEDIA GINGERLY
By Andrew E. Taslitz
Abstract
The rise of computer technology, the internet, rapid news dissemination, multi-tasking,
and social networking have wrought changes in human psychology that alter how we process
news media. More specifically, news coverage of high-profile trials necessarily focuses on
emotionally-overwrought, attention-grabbing information disseminated to a public having little
ability to process that information critically. The public’s capacity for empathy is likewise
reduced, making it harder for trial processes to overcome the unfair prejudice created by the
high-profile trial. Market forces magnify these changes. Free speech concerns limit the ability of
the law to alter media coverage directly, and the tools available to trial judges to minimize harm
to trial fairness are toothless. The usual solution has been lawyers’ ethics rules designed to
channel their communications with the press, particularly rules focusing on prosecutors.
This piece addresses these concerns, using a recent proposed revision to the American
Bar Association Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution Function as a jumping off point
for the discussion. Those Standards, like most state ethics rules, prohibit prosecutors from
making “public statements that the prosecutor reasonably should know will have a substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing a criminal proceeding.” Drawing on cognitive science,
behavioral economics, rumor-transmission studies, and jury research, this article argues that a
substantial likelihood of material prejudice to criminal proceedings from prosecutor statements
to the press will always be present in high profile cases. Accordingly, the rules generally
governing prosecutor dealings with the press, including the latest version of those rules
embodied in the proposed Standards, are unrealistic. Better rules are theoretically possible.
Nevertheless, this article concludes, such rules are not politically realistic. Accordingly, this
piece recommends modest changes to the proposed standards’ commentary to alert prosecutors
to the true nature of the risks arising from their contact with the media and recommending
prosecutor training and internal and external accountability mechanisms to improve prosecutor
performance in this area.
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Information Overload, Multi-tasking, and the Socially Networked Jury: Why Prosecutors
Should Approach the Media Gingerly
Andrew E. Taslitz*
I. Introduction
This article will argue that changes in technology and American culture create reasons for all
prosecutors to be even more cautious than was true in the past in interacting with the media.
Many of my comments could apply to defense counsel as well, but my focus here is on
prosecutors, both because of my limited space and my belief that they are the actors whose word
is likely to have the greatest impact on the public. More specifically, this article will raise doubts
about the effectiveness of the proposed American Bar Association Criminal Justice Standards for
the Prosecution Function, Standard 3-1.7, entitled, “Relationship with the Media.” The core
provision of that standard reads as follows:
(c) A prosecutor should not make or authorize the making of a
public statement that the prosecutor reasonably should know will
have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing a criminal
proceeding or unnecessarily heightening public condemnation of the
accused, except for statements that are necessary to inform the
public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor’s or law
enforcement actions and which serves a legitimate law enforcement
purpose (and subject to any exceptions in an applicable judicial rule
or rule of professional conduct).1
*Professor, Howard University School of Law; former Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, PA.; B.A., 1978,
Queens College; J.D., 1981, University of Pennsylvania Law School. My appreciation goes to the Howard
University School of Law for its support of this project and to my research assistants, Mahlet Ayalew, Melissa
Crespo, Francine Foote, and Sandi Pessin-Boyd for their outstanding assistance.
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This provision alters the current standard in two ways: first, by adding the word
“material” before the word “prejudice” (a standard that would seem to make it easier to talk to
the media because it is harder to prove “material” prejudice than any prejudice whatsoever);
second, by adding to the prohibition against unreasonably creating a substantial likelihood of
materially prejudicing a criminal proceeding a second prohibition, namely on “unnecessarily
heightening public condemnation of the accused.”2 In most cases, these new standards would
present no problem because media coverage of most criminal cases is non-existent or minimal.3
But in high-profile cases, these standards are unduly optimistic because media coverage
will almost invariably create a substantial likelihood of “materially prejudicing a criminal
proceeding” and of unnecessarily heightening condemnation of the accused. That does not
necessarily mean that the standard should be changed because there are free speech concerns that
are largely beyond the scope of this paper (though I will address them briefly in this article’s
conclusion). Instead, this paper’s focus is solely on the risk to a fair trial.4 That risk is
unavoidable. Prosecutors should not add to it and should therefore be cautious. At a minimum,
therefore, comments to the proposed standard should urge such caution and explain the reasons
justifying it. The standard is, after all, an aspirational one, offering guidance rather than
punishable dictates on prosecutor behavior.
1

ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROPOSED REVISIONS TO STANDARDS FOR
PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Standard 3-1.7(c) (Draft as of June 2010).
2
See id. at 16 (separately reciting the language of the current standard, drafted in 1993, and the proposed new
standard). It should be noted that current Rule 3.8(f), AM BAR ASS’N MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT, also
contains a general prohibition on “making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening
public condemnation of the accused,” but that language does not appear in the current Standards for the Prosecution
Function, which, along with the proposed revisions to those standards, are the subject of this symposium.
3
See Andrew E. Taslitz, The Duke Lacrosse Players and the Media: Why the Fair Trial/Free Press Paradigm
Doesn’t Cut It Anymore, in RACE TO INJUSTICE: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE DUKE LACROSSE RAPE CASE 175,
182-83 (Michael Seigel ed. 2009) [hereinafter Free Press].
4
Although the standards extend to impacts on a “criminal proceeding,” I focus solely on the impact on a fair trial
here. If unacceptable prejudice would occur at trial, it is likely also to infect trial alternatives, such as a guilty plea,
and many pretrial activities. Even where this is not necessarily so, however, the analysis for a fair trial can readily
be applied to other stages of a criminal proceeding, such as suppression motion hearings.
THE
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After this Introduction, Part II of this article explains that our fast-paced, hightechnology, multi-tasking, information overloading world makes it far more likely that audiences
will evaluate news media emotionally rather than critically and will be drawn to extreme
versions of the news. This observation is based on research concerning the impact of
information overload on cognitive functioning. Part II will further explain why and how the
news media caters to these tendencies in ways that lead to error, error likely to be slanted against
criminal defendants.
Part III examines why these same technological and cultural changes reduce the
likelihood of sustained, deep, critical thought generally, particularly in the case of crime news
stories. Such reduced ability to fairly evaluate the credibility and weight of media reports makes
it more unlikely that false or misleading statements will be challenged, truthful ones placed in
proper context, or counterarguments and counter-interpretations fairly considered. Somewhat
more speculatively, there is also reason to worry that technological and cultural changes are
impairing Americans’ on-average capacity for empathy – for fully understanding another’s
thoughts, feelings, and situation – a prerequisite for judging them fairly.5 Much news also
spreads by, and is interpreted through the process of, rumor-transmission. Yet the rise of the
internet amplifies the speed and scope of rumor, while increasing its capacity for fostering error.6
A less-critical, less empathetic audience is even less likely to spot these errors, as Part III further
explains. Finally, Part III reviews psychological research on pretrial publicity’s impact on juries,
research that further supports the risks to critical thinking and feeling already reviewed. Yet that
research likely undervalues the likely risks as rising generations raised on the internet and the
quickening pace of technology make the dangers to trial fairness all the greater.
5

See Andrew E. Taslitz, Why Did Tinkerbell Get Off So Easy?: The Roles of Imagination and Social Norms in
Excusing Human Weakness, 42 TEXAS TECH. L. REV. 419, 431-41 (2009) [hereinafter Tinkerbell].
6
See Taslitz, Free Press, supra note 3, at 182; infra text accompanying notes 247 - 253.
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Part IV, the conclusion, briefly reviews, however, countervailing concerns, such as free
speech, promoting sound democratic governance, responding to defense media coverage,
correcting inaccurate media reports, and overcoming pre-existing public biases that favor
prosecutor access to the press. Though this section is necessarily short given what can be
accomplished in a brief article, this section offers support for retaining the unavoidably flawed
core standard protecting the right to a fair trial but expanding the commentary to reflect the
concerns noted here and endorsing changes beyond those recited in the standards that are
necessary to improve prosecutor use of the press. Those changes include better prosecutorial
training and enhanced methods for maintaining prosecutorial transparency and accountability.
The conclusion also addresses some more minor drafting concerns.
I want to emphasize that I am no Luddite. Technology and the complexities of the
modern world have many benefits, including for criminal justice. But in the area of media
coverage, the risks to a fair trial are greater than ever before. Offering a fuller appreciation of
those risks is my primary goal here.
II. Information Overload and its Companions
A. A Day Spent in Overdrive
Consider the typical day of a middle-aged married male lawyer with two kids.7 He awakes to
music, perhaps from the ipod plugged into his wireless clock. He immediately checks his email
on his home computer, then rushes downstairs to help to feed the kids and get them ready for
school while a television set playing cartoons blares in the background. Once the kids are off, he
drives to the train, again listening to music on his ipod while talking on his hands-free cell phone

7

The example is my own but is inspired by the more detailed example offered in JACK FULLER, WHAT IS
HAPPENING TO NEWS: THE INFORMATION EXPLOSION AND THE CRISIS IN JOURNALISM 58-59 (2010). Fuller’s book
is the first work to explore the cognitive implications of information overload for the implosion of traditional news
media and thus more generally inspired Part II of this article.

5

to young associates and early-rising clients. On the train, he uses his ipad to review background
materials helpful for an upcoming deposition. At work, he edits a draft brief while listening to
music but with periodic interruptions from calls or text messages on his cell phone and from
emails and instant messages from clients who expect instant responses. He may also have
programmed his laptop to interrupt him if there is pressing news about the world, and he may
periodically glance at it to check out professional news feeds to keep him abreast of the latest
developments in his areas of practice. His day is punctuated with meetings where he and others
will check messages on their Blackberrys and conference calls that permit him to web surf or
even edit a draft direct examination during each call. After a full day, on the ride home he relaxes
by reading book excerpts on his ipad and again listening to music. Madness ensues when he
returns home: multiple television sets playing, one kid needing a ride to a recital, another to a
friend’s house, a brief moment of “peace” with his equally exhausted spouse until the kids return
home, a peace likely used to get ready for the next day’s professional challenges by working on a
laptop but perhaps at a more measured pace as a favorite television show plays in the
background, though interruptions recur, much like those during the working day.
His children in some ways lead still more frantic lives. They have grown up in this multitasking, multi-media, fast-paced world of limited attention spans and information overload.8
They crave it. Unlike their middle-aged parents, these kids obsess about social networking sites,
spending far more time on Facebook and MySpace interacting with scores or hundreds of
“friends” than with in-person connection.9 If they want to relate to one individual or a small
group, they text one another rather than using the cell phone.10 They may indeed rarely even

8

See LARRY D. ROSEN, REWIRED: UNDERSTANDING THE iGENERATION AND THE WAY THEY LEARN, 28-29 (2010).
See id. at 28-32.
10
See id. at 14-15, 35-37.
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answer their cellphones, unless the call is from mom or dad.11 They text as obsessively as they
network. Uni-tasking bores them.12 They do their homework while posting to their network sites,
texting friends, listening to music, watching television, and googling interesting topics, much of
this simultaneously or with quick task-switching.13 Parents must fight with the kids to get them
to complete their homework faster and to get them to read books from start to finish, with full
engagement and no distractions.14 Parents lose these fights, as do teachers.15 Older teens today
spend about twenty-one hours daily using technology.16 Obviously, they are not sleeping only
three hours per night and ditching school every day. This extraordinary number reflects the
remarkable degree of their multi-tasking.
B. Consequences of Overdrive: A First Look
1. Affective Consequences
Information overload, time pressure, and frequent interruptions create problems for our
limited brains.17 Our working memory can generally handle no more than about seven units of
information at a time.18 Lengthy and difficult training can perhaps expand that limit by a

11

See id. 36-37.
See id. at 2-3.
13
See id. at 28; Larry D. Rosen, Adolescents in MySpace: The State of Our Nation’s Youth: 2008-09 (Horatio Alger
Ass’n 2008); Larry D. Rosen, et al., The Association of Parenting Style and Child Age with Parental Limit Setting
and Adolescent MySpace Behavior,29 J. APPLIED DEV. PSYCH. 459, 459-71 (2008); D. TAPSCOTT, GROWN UP
DIGITAL: HOW THE NET GENERATION IS CHANGING YOUR WORLD 9 (2009).
14
See ROSEN, supra note 8, at 30-32, 33-35.
15
See id. at 75-76.
16
See id. at 28-30; E.A. Vandewater, et al., Digital Childhood: Electronic Media and Technology Use Among
Infants, Toddlers, and Pre-Schoolers, 119 (5) PEDIATRICS 1006-15 (2007). For analyses of media usage by other
age groups as well, see NPD Group, Kids Ages 12-14 Consume Digital Content on a Device between Three and
Seven Times Per Month, http://www.npd.com/press/releases/press_080115.html (January 15, 2009); A Mindlin,
Preferring the Web Over Watching TV, N.Y. TIMES, August 25, 2008,
;http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/25/technology/25drill.html; HORATIO ALGER ASS’N OF DISTINGUISHED
AMERICANS, THE STATE OF OUR NATION’S YOUTH 2008-09,
http://www.horatioalger.org/pdfs/0708SONY.pdf (2008).
17
See FULLER, supra note 7, at 60-61.
18
See id. at 63; see generally TORKEL KLINGBERG, THE OVERFLOWING BRAIN: INFORMATION OVERLOAD AND THE
LIMITS OF WORKING MEMORY (2009)(detailing the largely negative impact of modern-day information overload and
multi-tasking on working memory and the implications for cognitive performance and emotional state).
12
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maximum of two data bits in some individuals.19 In a complex world, many things scream for
our attention. But our attention is a scarce resource, requiring some means for us to economize
on it.20 This economy of attention operates more at an often subconscious emotional level than a
conscious intellectual one, particularly under circumstances of cognitive overload.21
Thus multi-tasking and information overload encourage greater reliance on stereotyping
and emotional cues in judging and deciding how to react to other persons.22 Severe time pressure
leads its victims to experience negative emotions, in turn focusing primarily on negative rather
than positive information.23 Interruption alone can cause emotional arousal,24 but the
combination of all these factors leads to still greater arousal.25 “Arousal” is a type of attention
that focuses on nothing in particular but rather is “a general heightening of perception and the
feeling of awareness.”26 Intense arousal constitutes stress.27 The greater the degree of cognitive
demands, the greater the intensity of emotional arousal.28 The aroused brain is more prone to
certain kinds of judgment errors.29 It is also more prone to focus on specific environmental
stimuli -- to select what aspects of the world merit greater attention – based upon their emotional
intensity.30

19

See KLINBERG, supra note 18, at 121-24.
See FULLER, supra note 7, at 63-64.
21
See id.; RICHARD LANHAM, THE ECONOMICS OF ATTENTION: STYLE AND SUBSTANCE IN THE AGE OF
INFORMATION (2007); THOMAS H. DAVENPORT & JOHN C. BECK, THE ATTENTION ECONOMY (2002).
22
See FULLER, supra note 7, at 61; Gordon H. Bower & Jordan P. Forgas, Affect Memory and Social Cognition, in,
COGNITION AND EMOTION 141 (Eric Eich, et al. ed.s 2000).
23
See FULLER, supra note 7, at 61; Anne Edland & Ola Svenson, Judgment and Decision Making under Time
Pressure: Studies and Findings, in TIME PRESSURE AND STRESS IN HUMAN JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 27,
28 (Anne Edland & Ola Svenson ed.s ); John A. Maule & G. Robert J. Hockey, State, Stress, and Time Pressure, in
TIME PRESSURE AND STRESS IN HUMAN JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 86 (Anne Edland & Ola Svenson ed.s).
24
See GEORGE MANDLER, MIND AND BODY: PSYCHOLOGY OF EMOTION AND STRESS 171(1984).
25
See FULLER, supra note 7, at 61-62.
26
Id. at 60; see KLINBERG, supra note 18, at 20-22.
27
See FULLER, supra note 7, at 60.
28
See id; KLINBERG, supra note 18, at 20-22.
29
See FULLER, supra note 7, at 60-61.
30
See id. at 60-62; JOHN J. RATEY, A USER’S GUIDE TO THE BRAIN: PERCEPTION, ATTENTION, AND THE FOUR
THEATRES OF THE BRAIN 121 (2002) (noting that by the time the brain is conscious of a sensation, “the amygdala

20
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The problem is complicated by the phenomenon of habituation.31 Much like some drug
addicts, the appeal of continued exposure to the same emotionally intense information fades over
time. The emotion addict needs a stronger fix.32 Only the ever-more emotionally intense aspects
of the environment are able to grab the addict’s attention.33 Information failing to meet this
criterion is ignored, leaving us attention-blind, as if the information never existed.34 Those who
want our attention must try ever-harder. In a world where distraction, sensory inundation, and
task-switching are almost ever-present, emotional arousal will run especially high.35 That in turn
means that competition for our attention will become increasingly fierce via the low-road tools of
appealing to the amygdala, a critical brain structure for marking information based upon its
emotional appeal.36 If not all Americans so react, the average reaction of the average American
to our high-technology world is surely tipping toward the world of arousal. Market competition
in the economy of attention is thus affective, rather than intellectual, warfare.
2. Media Structure
In days gone by, audiences had few technological sources for news. There were three
national television stations, maybe one or two additional local ones in major cities. But cable and
the rise of the internet have led to a vast multiplication of potential news sources.37 Round-theclock cable news stations compete with network news, both in turn competing with on-line
publications, blogs, social networking sites, electronic bulletin boards, news “apps,” and a host
has already branded it with a raw emotional valence somewhere along the continuum from mildly interesting to ‘oh
my God!’”).
31
See FULLER, supra note 7, at 71 (summarily defining habituation); MARK JOHNSON, THE MEANING OF THE BODY:
AESTHETICS OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 34-35 (2007) (defining habituation and its underlying processes in more
depth).
32
See FULLER, supra note 7, at 71.
33
See id. at 71-72.
34
See id.
35
See id. at 60-62, 71-73.
36
See id. at 40, 47, 49-55 (analyzing the amygdala’s role and the role of emotions more generally in governing the
economy of attention); JOSEPH LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN: THE MYSTERIOUS UNDERPINNINGS OF
EMOTIONAL LIFE 157-69 (1996) (explaining the cognitive and emotional “low” and “high” roads).
37
See FULLER, supra note 7, at 65-67.
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of other options.38 Increased competition means that producers must give the consumers more of
what the latter want.39 But wants, including for news, are diverse. One way to compete,
therefore, is to alter programming to appeal to market segments.40 This market fragmentation
means news specialization. Thus Fox News offers a conservative slant, MSNBC a moderately
liberal one, the Huffington Post a progressive one. Audience fragmentation in which we each
watch primarily the news with which we already are likely to agree leads to group polarization.
Group polarization is a phenomenon in which like-minded members of groups, hearing
only from persons already agreeing with them, become increasingly extreme in their views.41
There are several likely causes of this growing polarization. First, the argument pool becomes
limited. Group members are simply never exposed to contrary views.42 Second, individuals tend
to like those who are most similar to them.43 Moreover, we are a “groupish” species, looking for
ways to distinguish “us” from “them,” with “us” being somehow superior.44 To be more accepted
by the group as a whole requires increasingly energetic efforts to craft reasons for agreeing with
the group’s views and ways more sharply to distinguish the group from outsiders.45 Views thus

38

See id.
See id. at 69-70.
40
See id.; Sendhil Mullainathan & Andrei Shleifer, The Market for News, http://www.ssrn.com (2004) (two
economists’ predicting that increased competition for news readers leads to market fragmentation if audience beliefs
are diverse).
41
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 11-14 (2003) [hereinafter DISSENT]. There are ways to
overcome the ill effects of group polarization, but they require careful design and implementation of decision
making procedures in a way unlikely to arise from ordinary market competition. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Eyewitness
Identification, Democratic Deliberation, and the Politics of Science, 4 CARDOZO J. PUB. L., POL’Y, & ETHICS 271
(2006) [hereinafter Democratic Deliberation].
42
See SUNSTEIN, DISSENT, supra note 41, at 120-21.
43
See id. at (“If individual [group] members perceive one another as friendly, likable, and similar to themselves, the
size and likelihood of the [polarization] shift will increase.”); Taslitz, Tinkerbell, supra note 5, at 433 (analyzing the
general psychology of liking similar persons).
44
See DAVID BERREBY, US & THEM 67, 129-332, 206-09, 232 (2005).
45
See SUNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 122-24, 129-31.
39
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tend to become more extreme. Media outlets, to appeal to their relevant markets, must, therefore,
also become more extreme.46
When this tendency toward market segmentation and group polarization is combined
with an audience selling its attention only for an ever-increasingly-intense emotional appeal,
media are forced into “an emotional arms race.”47 As Pulitzer prize-winning former Chicago
Tribune publisher Jack Fuller puts it, “[t]he aroused brain might be drawn to a neo-populist
commentator ranting about illegal immigration, a film clip of an explosion ripping, or – turning
to humor to regulate a surfeit of emotion – a comedian delivering a satire on the day’s news.”48
Concludes Fuller:
Emotional presentation succeeds across all class lines and has
attained wide legitimacy. The curve has shifted toward emotional
presentation. As bandwidth increases and the cost of computing drops,
message immersion will continue to increase, and with it a further shift
of the curve. We may only be at the beginning of the process.49
3. Sources of Judgment Error
If the news that we receive is increasingly slanted, often portraying only one side of the
picture fully, and if it relies on emotional intensity more than cognitive content to grab our
attention, it would seem at first blush sound to assume that audiences would eventually catch on.
Our high-tech world does not, despite some of its ill consequences, render us all stupid.50 Indeed,
it makes more views available in total if only we would spend the time to examine them fairly.51
Unfortunately, a variety of human reasoning processes, many of them unconscious, suggest that

46

See FULLER, supra note 7, at 69.
See id. at 71.
48
See id.
49
Id. at 73.
50
For arguments, a subset of which are refuted here, that the net does much cognitive good, see STEVEN JOHNSON,
EVERYTHING BAD IS GOOD FOR YOU (2006).
51
See REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 (2009).
47
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most of us either will not see the problem, will not care about it, and will not put in the energy to
correct it.
Notably, the confirmation bias – the tendency to seek and retain evidence and arguments
that confirm our pre-existing beliefs – means that we often filter out contradicting evidence.52
Furthermore, our powers of self-deception are enormous.53 If we reach a decision on purely
irrational grounds, that creates a sense of “cognitive dissonance” with our understanding of
ourselves as rational beings.54 Accordingly, we confabulate a rationalization, a seemingly
rational explanation for the arguably irrational.55 For example, many of us have a tendency to
favor items on the right over those on the left.56 Accordingly, a chooser might favor the cup of
coffee on the right over that on the left. But the chooser will never admit to himself that he just
likes things on the right better, so he comes up with a detailed explanation of why the rightplaced coffee is richer tasting, sweeter-smelling than the left-placed coffee.57 Similarly,
individuals will insist that emotional appeals have nothing to do with their choice of news and
that the media has little impact on them, crafting alternative explanations for their behavior.58
They may also display “third party effects,” agreeing that media manipulation may work on
others but not on themselves.59 That denial, of course, makes it harder for them to overcome the

52

See Peter Goldie, Emotion, Feeling, and Knowledge of the World, in THINKING ABOUT FEELING: CONTEMPORARY
PHILOSOPHERS ON EMOTION 99-100 (Robert C. Solomon ed. 2004) (defining and explaining the confirmation bias);
FULLER, supra note 7, at 183 (applying confirmation bias to the media context).
53
See Andrew E. Taslitz, Willfully Blinded: On Date Rape and Self-Deception, 28 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 381
(2005).
54
See KAREN A. DILL, HOW FANTASY BECOMES REALITY: SEEING THROUGH MEDIA INFLUENCE 21-23 (2009)
(defining and explaining cognitive dissonance).
55
See FULLER, supra note 7, at 76 (explaining application of a similar process to media news reports).
56
See DILL, supra note 54, at 29.
57
See id. (offering a similar example but involving choosing panty hose); see generally SHEENA IYENGAR, THE
ART OF CHOOSING (2010) (exploring the psychology of choosing).
58
See DILL, supra note 54, at 21-25. This observation follows from the broader point that we rationalize our
emotions as well as our choices. See FULLER, supra note 7, at 76 (“[B]ecause the pattern-making, contradictionavoiding brain has a gift for rationalizing, it will usually make up a reason for any feeling it has and believe it, at
least consciously.”).
59
See DILL, supra note 54, at 10.
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very manipulation to which the media subjects them.60 Cognitive dissonance could be resolved
by means other than rationalization but that “would require real strength – strength of character,
strength of intellect, and the strength to make real social change.”61 It would also require serious
education and training in how to overcome these biases.
The “fundamental attribution error” also plays a role.62 This error is our tendency to
attribute outcomes more to an individual’s character than to his situation.63 This error makes it
more likely that observers will attribute a theft to the purported thief’s tainted character than to
his starving because the Great Recession drove his firm out of business.64 As Walter Lippmann
put it long before the research had given the phenomenon a name, “To many simple and
frightened minds there was no political reverse, no strike, no obstruction, no mysterious death or
mysterious conflagration anywhere in the world of which the causes did not wind back
to…personal sources of evil.”65
This error can be particularly egregious because of our tendency to make holistic
judgments about character based upon one trait and to form impressions concerning that trait
based upon only the flimsiest of evidence.66 Hearing a rumor that a neighbor has engaged in a
single act of unkindness might thus result in perceiving that neighbor as irredeemably cruel. The
error is also magnified by high states of arousal, including fear.67 Subconscious fear based upon
race, such as black skin color, thus results in a particularly extreme phenomenon, the “ultimate
60

See id. at 22-23.
Id. at 23.
62
See FULLER, supra note 7, at 76 (applying the fundamental attribution error to media content and audience
reception).
63
See RICHARD NISBETT & ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF HUMAN JUDGMENT 31
(1980).
64
See Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Blindsight: the Absurdity of Color-Blind Criminal Justice, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
1, 6 - 7 (2007) [hereinafter Racial Blindsight].
65
WALTER LIPPMAN, PUBLIC OPINION 7 (1965)
66
See Andrew E. Taslitz, Myself Alone: Individualizing Justice through Psychological Character Evidence, 52 MD.
L. REV. 1, 6 -9 (1991) [hereinafter Myself Alone].
67
See Taslitz, Racial Blindsight, supra note 64, at 8 - 9.
61
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fundamental attribution error” in which an actor’s race becomes the basis for attributing to him
an evil character.68
A related error is “misguided parsimony,” reducing the causes of complex events to a
single cause.69 It is easier to blame either Alan Greenspan or foolish mortgage purchasers for the
Great Recession than to blame multiple, complex, and ambiguous causes.70 Time-pressured
journalists thus often favor this oversimplification, knowing that their audience will buy into it,
especially if the simplification is consistent with the audience’s pre-existing views.71
Novelty is a better attention-grabber than the familiar.72 Additionally, harmful events are
more memorable than helpful ones.73 Our greater attention to the negative over the positive
likely has evolutionary roots.74 Not seeing the poisonous snake may kill us instantly while not
seeing the juicy piece of fruit at worst leaves us (perhaps temporarily) hungry.75 Media thus push
novel, negative stories over positive ones, slanting story content and painting an inaccurate,
usually more frightening than is justified, picture of the world.76 No matter how much audiences
may bemoan the dearth of positive news stories, they are more readily drawn to the negative. As
one ex-reporter admitted, “when the nine o’clock news comes on television and a live report
showing the dome lights of the hook and ladders flashing and the flames licking out an upstairs
window, I do not turn the channel.”77
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In highly emotional situations, our ability to reason probabilistically is also
compromised.78 Vivid, concrete descriptions of suffering trigger such emotional states.79 Thus,
law students evaluating the risk of developing cancer from small amounts of arsenic in water
were willing to pay vastly more to eliminate that risk when given descriptions of the cancer as
“very gruesome and intensely painful” and “eat[ing] away at the internal organs of the body”
than were law students not given such descriptions.80 Yet both groups of students were given
identical data on the low probabilities of developing the cancer.81 Emotionally vivid information
is simply more readily available for cognitive processing than is less vivid information, and it is
thus the more vivid, though not necessarily the more useful, information on which we prefer to
rely.82
“Framing effects,” using emotionally powerful language or images that trigger a certain
perspective on a problem, also alter perceptions.83 Describing someone protesting the use of
racial epithets as a “censor” rather than a loving egalitarian triggers images of jack-booted thugs
crushing freedoms rather than of freedom fighters exercising rights to counter-speech.84 Framing
effects can lead to decisions based on shallow, “peripheral” routes to persuasion rather than the
“central” routes relying on message content and the quality of argument.85
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The “representativeness” heuristic leads us to make judgments based upon our beliefs
about the qualities of what we have been taught are representative members of the group, even if
our judgments are irrational.86 A perceiver may thus be asked whether a woman who is a liberal,
a fan of the Grateful Dead, and an advocate for legalizing marijuana is more likely a political
reporter than a local one. Many perceivers are likely to choose “political reporter” because the
woman sounds like their notion of someone representative of at least progressive reporters.87 Yet
there are likely far more local reporters than political ones, so the probabilities are just the
opposite.88
Memory affects attention too. We are less likely to remember pallid positive information
than vivid negative information, thus making it easier to retrieve the latter to guide impressionformation and decision making.89 We are, however, not only bad at accurately remembering the
past but equally bad at predicting the future.90 Therefore, we may overestimate the future effect
of certain events on our future happiness, particularly negative ones that arguably involve giving
up that which we already have.91 Media play to these fears as well.92
Logical forms of argument are also less gripping than arguments framed as stories.93 We
are story-telling creatures.94 Stories define our personal identities, our conceptions of whom we
86
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can trust, our understandings of how the world works.95 But stories necessarily require selectivity
about reporting observed experiences and conformity with the dictates of dramatization.96 There
must be heroes and villains, winners and losers. Stories require characters that come alive,
emotional tension, and clear plot lines.97 Stories also turn on intentions, something hard to judge
from limited information.98 Stories can trigger powerful emotions in the audience and teach
moral lessons. They require use of the imagination.99 Stories are not false because they involve
narrative. One story can be more or less true than another.100 But where information is lacking,
reporters may readily turn to, and listeners respond to, stock stories (typical ones) rather than
individualized ones.101 Stories about real people are thus reduced to stereotypes.102 Moreover, if
the stories are about crime, as so many are (remember our obsession with the negative), the
audience will expect and receive information about the “bad guys,” usually meaning the
suspect.103 Where there is a dearth of information about character and intentions, the media will
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suggest some, or audiences will assume some.104 Much of this information can be conveyed
subconsciously and indirectly, through language choice (“perpetrator”), relative exposure to
minority races as supposed evildoers, and selectivity in what evidence is reported, what not.105
Stories partly have their appeal because of “mirror neurons.”106 If we see or hear another
suffering, neurons fire that simulate the victim’s suffering as our own.107 The two experiences
are, of course, not identical, but they are sufficiently similar that watching suffering can cause
many of us pain and anger at pain seen as undeserved.108 The power of our imagination allows us
to empathize with real and imagined persons alike (we cry at the mother’s pain at her child’s loss
in a movie scene).109 Coverage that stresses crime victims’ pain thus encourages empathy for the
victim at anger at his or her presumed assailant.110
A variety of social forces also seem to be eroding trust in experts, including expert
opinion reported in the news.111 Many debate the reasons for this declining trust.112 Some of it
may involve the media’s own reporting of the supposed frequent failures of many of our social
and political institutions.113 Some of it may be due to a postmodern skepticism that there are any
value-free “right” answers to most questions.114 Perhaps we are simply in an anti-elitist cyclical
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phase of American democracy, as some historians claim.115 Whatever the explanation, audiences
give decreasing credibility to true, “expert” journalists and increasing credibility to those, like
Glenn Beck, who lack formal training in journalistic standards.116 On the other hand, perceptions
of source credibility rise with those whom we know personally or with sources that we use
routinely, so reports from social networking sites and familiar blogs get much credence.117 The
overall tendency is to turn previously professional reporting into showmanship.118 As
infotainment rises and the audience for serious reporting declines, resources shift as well away
from investigative and critical journalism toward high-tech fluff.119 We live on the artificial
pabulum called news while our critical senses become dulled.
III. The Decline of Deep Thought and of Empathy
A. The Basic Argument
Indeed, our capacity for sustained critical thought might itself be at risk.120 What tasks we
use our brains to accomplish affects the structure of our brains.121 Certain oft-used neuronal
connections become easier, faster, increasing in number and complexity, while others
infrequently used wither.122 These changes in connections make some tasks easier and more

314, 327-38 (Carolina Academic Press, ed. Robin Miller 2004) (defining “postmodernism” and comparing it to its
alternatives).
115
See FULLER, supra note 7, at 95-98.
116
See id. at 5, 14, 87-88, 96-98.
117
See infra text accompanying notes 177 - 182 (discussing sources of credibility and trust in the generations raised
on the internet); FULLER, supra note 7, at 99 (“[T]he very interactivity of the new [on-line] environment can
stimulate trust – perhaps greater than traditional media ever can – even between people who don’t know one
another’s name.”); RUSSELL HARDIN, TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS 1, 152 (2002) (arguing that we ordinarily
have greater trust in those with whom we have ongoing relationships than in distant others).
118
See FULLER, supra note 7, at 92-93.
119
See id. 70-73, 92-93 (discussing shifting resources); SURETTE, supra note 103 (discussing “infotainment”).
120
See generally NICHOLAS CARR, THE SHALLOWS: WHAT THE INTERNET IS DOING TO OUR BRAINS (2010)
(articulating a book-length argument of this point); MAGGIE JACKSON, DISTRACTED: THE EROSION OF ATTENTION
AND THE COMING DARK AGE (2008) (similar).
121
See CARR, supra note 120, at 48-57, 63.
122
See id.

19

probable, others harder, less likely.123 The human brain’s natural state is probably one of
distractedness124, “rapidly and involuntarily shifting attention to salient visual features of
potential importance.”125 In particular, we became acutely sensitive to environmental changes so
that predators could not surprise us or food sources escape us.126 Environmental and cultural
changes required acts of will to overcome these tendencies and develop the capacity for
sustained thought.127 British research psychologist Vaughn Bell thus declares that “[t]he ability
to focus on a single task, relatively uninterrupted … [is] a strange anomaly in the history of our
psychological development.”128 Close reading of books especially required intense
concentration, getting lost in a book meaning that readers “made their own associations, drew
their own inferences and analogies, fostered their own ideas. They thought deeply as they read
deeply.”129
Net reading returns us to the practiced distractedness of an earlier evolutionary era.130
Hyperlinks break information into chunks, permitting a multi-sensory experience.131 The content
displayed on the computer screen fragments our attention as we shift from video to word, to
audio, often using all simultaneously.132 Links permit jumping from one bit of information to
another bit without the necessity for careful synthesis.133 Searchability decreases our incentives
to take a work in as a whole as the scraps of information we seek for instrumental reasons
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become easy to find rapidly.134 Skimming replaces close reading, a phenomenon observed even
among academics.135 Indeed, the rise of e-readers like the Kindle, the Nook, and the iPad, which
allow net surfing during reading and heighten book searchability, are likely to accelerate these
trends. Even author Steven Johnson, a staunch defender of the advantages of the brain changes
wrought by modern technology,136 worries that “one of the great joys of book reading – the total
immersion in another world, or in the world of the author’s ideas – will be compromised. We all
may read books the way we increasingly read magazines and newspapers: a little bit here, a little
bit there.”137
Researchers have found that the “repetitive, intensive, interactive, addictive” use of the
internet promotes particularly rapid brain changes.138 The net seizes but scatters our attention
rapidly and repeatedly.139 Unlike interruptions of periods of sustained thought, which permit rest
and renewal, constant distractedness harms more than hurts our sustained critical thinking
skills.140 In one study, it took just five hours of novices learning to use the internet for their
brains to rewire in ways making them virtually indistinguishable from those of experienced
users.141
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More areas of the brain are active when we use the net than when we engage in deep
reading.142 But this occurs precisely because multi-tasking requires use of many brain areas but
in a shallow way.143 Long-term memory is not merely the brain’s filing system but also the home
of “complex concepts, or schemas,” the “seat of understanding.”144 “We are able to understand
concepts in our areas of expertise because we have schemas associated with those concepts,”
explains educational psychologist John Sweller.145 The deep concentration involved in unitasking allows the small amount of data stored in short-term memory to make its way into longterm memory, enhancing schema formation.146 But high cognitive load interferes with schema
formation, leaving our understanding shallow. Likewise, high cognitive load makes it harder for
us to distinguish relevant from irrelevant information.147
Indeed, though the results of the research are not uniform, the preponderance of the research
evidence is that hypertext readers understand less than linear readers.148 The high cognitive load
involved in the former weakens “establishing relationships between concepts, drawing
inferences, activating prior knowledge, and synthesizing main ideas.”149
Importantly, multi-media presentations can be organized to aid understanding. But they must
be carefully designed to be effective, as educational psychologists have shown.150 For example,
auditory and visual memory are sufficiently distinct that using both simultaneously can under the

142

See Gary W. Small, et al., Your Brain on Google: Patterns of Cerebral Activation during Internet Searching, 17
AM. J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 116 (2009).
143
See CARR, supra note 120, at 121-22.
144
See id. at 124.
145
John Sweller, Instructional Design in Technical Areas 11 (Australian Council for Educational Research 1999).
146
See CARR, supra note 120, at 124-25.
147
See id. at 125; KLINGBERG, supra note 18, at 339, 72-75 (explaining why cognitive overload “makes distractions
more distracting.”).
148
See CARR, supra note 120, at 129-31.
149
Erping Zhu, Hypermedia Interface Design: The Effects of Number of Links and Granularity of Nodes,8 J.
EDUCATIONAL MULTIMEDIA AND HYPERMEDIA 331 (1999).
150
See CARR, supra note 120, at 131.

22

right circumstances actually increase effective working memory.151 On the other hand, multiple
demands making use of the same memory system, such as multiple visual stimuli, interfere with
working memory.152 But the common internet user is not an educational psychologist. Moreover,
effective multimedia presentations minimize interruptions, precisely the opposite of what
happens in the networked life.153 Cognitive switching between just two tasks, much less three or
four, short-circuits real understanding, the evidence reveals.154
Browsing and scanning can be effective ways to identify information for further, deeper
study. Too often, however, the browsing and scanning becomes an excuse for broad but
superficial reasoning.155 Concludes Jordan Grafman, the head of the National Institute of
Neurological Disorders’ cognitive neuroscience unit, “’The more you multitask, the less
deliberative you become; the less able to think and reason out a problem.’”156 Conformity rises
too as you “rely on conventional ideas and solutions rather than challenging them with original
lines of thought.”157 In sum,
The mental functions that are losing the “survival of the busiest”
brain cell battle are those that support calm, linear thought -- the ones
we use in traversing a lengthy narrative or an involved argument, the
ones we draw on when we reflect on our experiences or contemplate an
outward or inward phenomenon. The winners are those functions that
help us speedily locate, categorize, and assess disparate bits of
information in a variety of forms, that let us maintain our mental
bearings while being bombarded by stimuli. These functions are, not
coincidentally, very similar to the ones performed by computers, which
are programmed for the high-speed transfer of information. Once again,
we seem to be taking on the characteristics of a popular new
intellectual technology.158
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If it is true that our capacity for critical thought is, on average, being compromised by our
technology while that same technology makes us respond to media more with heart than head, it
becomes increasingly hard to see how the bulk of our population can effectively spot the flaws in
media news coverage, particularly of such an emotionally radioactive topic like crime.
B. Criticisms and Caveats
There are three major criticisms that can be made of the argument that there is a decline
in critical thought. None of these three undercuts my argument.
First, brain changes come from practice, so we can simply require people to practice deep
thought.159 Indeed, one leading cognitive psychologist has argued that teaching that capacity is
the whole point of a university education.160 There is thus no reason for despair. As an academic,
I certainly am not going to challenge the value of a university education. Nevertheless, there is
an elitism here that is worrisome. The majority of our population still does not receive a
university education.161 Many who study beyond high school may attend two-year community
colleges or hone very specific job skills not particularly requiring mastery of deep analytical
thinking.162 If this critic is right, there is a new kind of digital divide arising: that between
159
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citizens most capable of serious critical thought and those far less capable.163 For deep reading
and sharp critical skills to become the “province of a small and dwindling elite”164 cannot be a
good thing for democracy.
Furthermore, if children are raised in a multitasking, multimedia world, it is not so clear
that simply insisting on deep reading, even at the university level, will work. Students must first
be engaged, and long lectures, class discussion of assigned materials, even Power Point slides,
are no longer enough to do the job.165 Frustrated professors indeed increasingly experiment with
multimedia books to replace the linear ones of yesteryear as one effort to re-engage their young
audiences – and this occurs even at the graduate level.166 Grade inflation, the absence of many
long papers, and the ability to paste together ideas found from combing the net may mean that
most university students get along just fine without intensive, uni-tasking studying.167 Most law
professors can attest that the bulk of first-year students do not arrive with a mastery of analytical
thinking.168 In any event, the bulk of jurors in most areas of the country – our ultimate concern
here -- will not be the product of four-year, high-quality university educations.169
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Indeed, the second criticism has two parts: (a) the cognitive losses are not so bad; and (b)
we simply cannot effectively teach this and upcoming generations without buying into their
lifelong habits of scattered thinking.170 We must join them rather than fight them. The first part
of this argument relies on research showing that certain kinds of multitasking may slow learning
but do not make it less effective.171 However, time is finite in and outside the classroom, and
slower learning is a high cost to pay. Furthermore, much of this research [correct?] focuses on
memorization, the raw retention of information, rather than the higher-level critical skills that I
focus upon here.172 Additionally, these critics concede that properly-designed multitasking is
important, such as trying to avoid simultaneous tugs on similar types of processing, such as
visual processing.173
The second portion of this argument has more force. It probably is necessary to use social
networking; properly structured multimedia presentations; more active learning; and greater
multisensory, more realistic simulations as ways to engage students and improve their
learning.174 Indeed, such changes in teaching style may make it easier to prod students toward
deeper learning. But most teachers at most levels have not made such changes, indeed are not yet
aware of the need for such changes.175 It may be many years before such changes occur,
resistance by those wedded to old ways is likely, and experimentation in the field will be needed
for some time to come to improve these ways of teaching. To make the case for change,
however, the critics point out how untutored net users – the vast bulk of the net population –
currently are so poor at analytical reasoning, even in using the net.176
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For example, researchers have discovered that elementary schoolchildren lack the ability
to assess the credibility, relevance, and weight of numerous sources identified via websites.177
But the same has proven to be true with college students. In one study nearly half of college
students used only the first five links on an internet research project.178 Only fifteen percent used
the first ten links, twelve percent all the links on the first page, three percent links beyond the
first three pages.179 Yet educators agreed that looking further was “necessary to find the best and
most reliable information.”180Other experimenters found that college students most trusted the
first links appearing in a search even when less relevant than later ones.181 College students
generally tend not to distinguish among the credibility of sources and uncritically to accept what
appears on a website, though much of it is “unverified, unsubstantiated thoughts and
opinions….”182 Blogs are especially troublesome because, unlike traditional journalists’ work
product, they do not pass through several editors’ hands, nor are they required to meet
journalistic evidentiary standards.183
Indeed, the more young people use the internet, the more credible they believe it to be.
They find particularly credible sites containing information that interests them or in which they
are invested.184 Moreover, website users generally, regardless of age, are insufficiently skeptical
of information that they find on the web.185 Very few in one study were “extremely concerned,”
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willing to look outside the website specifically to explore the credibility of its authors or the
accuracy of its information.186
Net users make heaviest use of those sources that they trust most,187 that is, that
seemingly display honesty (keeping one’s word), benevolence (not trying to mislead), and
competence (accuracy).188 But, in descending order, users place the greatest trust in peer
recommendations (by far the highest), on-line consumer opinions, editorial content, brand
websites and sponsorships, and television – more trust than in traditional, edited newspaper
reporting, though being quite distrustful of most forms of advertising.189
Individual differences matter, with those generally more trusting of people also being
more trusting of websites.190 But people seem indiscriminately to trust expert and non-expert
sources alike.191 Yet, “[s]ources that look professional, contain a wide variety of material, and
are used by many have source credibility but may lack real credibility.”192 In one study of
perceived website trustworthiness, almost half the respondents preferred and trusted Wikipedia
over other sources of information when asked where they would go to research a specific
topic.193
Commentators urging educators to embrace net learning styles thus simultaneously stress
the importance of training net users from a young age in such simple concepts as that media
images have points of view, are not always accurate, may reflect differing opinions, are targeted
to different populations of people, and often exist to make money or serve some other specific
186
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agenda.194 Furthermore, users must be trained to explore net authors’ credentials and credibility;
to search for peer-reviewed sources to back up on-line claims; to use print sources where on-line
ones are incomplete, unavailable, or potentially inaccurate; to distinguish observations from
opinion; and to uncover sources of bias.195 These skills must be taught at higher educational
levels too because college students similarly lack adequate net literacy.196
Third, IQ scores have risen steadily, so, to the extent that they are an accurate measure of
intelligence – a questionable claim – intelligence arguably does not seem to have suffered from
the rise of the internet.197 But there has in fact been little, if any, improvement in the portions of
the test involving memory, math, general knowledge, or vocabulary. The improvement has come
primarily in tests involving mentally rotating objects, finding similarities among them, and
arranging them into logical sequences.198 Moreover, verbal scores on other measures of
intellectual skill, such as the PSAT and the SAT have declined.199 Even IQ scores have started
falling in many Western nations since the 1990s.200 Overall intelligence is a hard concept to
measure, perhaps not a valid one at all.201 Consequently, these measures may reveal nothing
more than a changing of our brains, a switching from deeper thinking skills to more shallow ones
in a way that does not overall dramatically affect IQ measures.202 But the new net-brain is neither
better nor worse than its predecessors, no what IQ and other scores say. The new brain is simply
different, with its own strengths and weaknesses.203 Among those weaknesses, unfortunately, is a
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greater difficulty with the deeper, analytical thinking necessary to viewing news reports and
images skeptically and with an open mind.
C. Declining Empathy
Up until now, I have spoken as if there is a sharp, unbridgeable difference between
emotions and cognitions. In fact, there are generally differences in degrees, differences
substantial enough in relevant ways here to justify my writing as if the two processes were
dichotomous. They are not.204 For example, to fear spiders, you must first conclude that they are
dangerous – a conclusion that I personally had rejected until being hospitalized after receiving a
brown recluse spider bite.205 The thought triggers and is in some sense part of the emotion.206
Empathy is often thought of as an emotion and a positive one at that. But it need not be so
viewed. Empathy, properly understood, is the ability to stand in another person’s shoes, to see
and feel the world through their eyes.207 Empathy requires the exercise of imagination, and the
accuracy of empathy also requires information about another’s life experiences and current
situation.208 Empathy is a form of speculative mind reading.209 Once we have read the other’s
mind, however, that may trigger both thoughts and feelings. We may be horrified by what we
find, or at least judge the other’s thoughts, emotions, and thus resulting actions worthy of
censure.210 Alternatively, we may resonate with the other’s heart and mind, feeling sympathy for
his plight, wanting to reduce his suffering, even if he deserves some of it.211 Accuracy in judging
others therefore requires accuracy in empathy.
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Yet there is at least some reason to worry that empathy is becoming more scarce. One
recent major study found this year’s college graduates the least empathetic in decades based
upon standard psychological measures.212 If that conclusion is accurate, there could be many
reasons for that decline. But the net and modern media likely have much to do with it.213 Media
increasingly portray violence as “cool, gratifying, fun, and without consequences.”214 Various
studies have concluded that exposure to media violence reduces empathy.215 Even worse,
consumers are unaware of this effect.216 One study found that those who just finished playing a
violent video game were less likely to help a person being hurt in their presence.217 Other studies
found the brain activity of violent video game users consistent with reduced sensitivity to the
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suffering of others.218 Still other brain studies reveal the release of dopamine in violent video
game users, linking violence therefore with pleasure of an addictive nature.219 The Mind Science
Foundation,220 in studying television violence, reported that watching such violence
recruits a network of brain regions involved in the regulation of
emotion, arousal and attention, episodic memory encoding and
retrieval, and motor programming. This pattern of brain activations
may explain the behavioral effects observed in many studies,
especially the finding that children who are frequent viewers of TV
violence are more likely to behave aggressively. Such extensive
viewing may result in a large number of aggressive scripts stored in
long-term memory in the posterior singulate, which facilitates rapid
recall of aggressive scenes that serve as a guide for overt social
behavior.221
Moreover, noted these researchers, although the game players were aware that the violence was
not real, their brains reacted as if it were real.222
Mirror neurons, discussed earlier, are essential to empathy.223 Those neurons are more
likely to fire, however, when we are interacting with someone whom we perceive as similar to
us.224 Despite improvements, media stereotyping of racial minorities continues.225 Even if equal
numbers of Blacks and Whites are shown engaging in violence on television, most Whites have
little close contact with Blacks, certainly few Black friends.226 Whites will thus know other
Whites who are nonviolent, but most Whites’ image of Blacks will come primarily from the
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media.227 Exposure to images of Black violence takes its toll.228 In video game studies, “the
presence of an African American male video game character primed (brought to mind) the
concept of violence.”229 Fear of the other and perceived difference from him make empathy hard,
in turn making sympathy hard, even where it is deserved.230
Storytelling, as also noted earlier, has special power. Yet both fictional media and news
media necessarily engage in narrative.231 But, “[w]hen you get lost in a story, you become
uncritical of the persuasive messages embedded in the story, accepting them involuntarily.”232
Mere descriptions of someone as dangerous therefore have far less impact than story-embedded
images, “such as when an African American man in a video game is portrayed as a street
criminal.”233 Concludes social psychologist Karen Dill, “Since we don’t differentiate between
stereotypes we’ve just imagined and those we’ve seen confirmed in real life, then surely we
don’t differentiate between real people who confirm a stereotype and fictional characters who
do.”234 Media tales thus particularly create obstacles to empathy.
Self-control, patience, and deferred gratification are also central to empathy. In repeated
experiments over decades, children displaying the least self-control were more likely than other
children to become bullies, get poor teacher evaluations, and abuse drugs.235 Self-control was
related to attentional control. Children who could shift their attention away from the desired
object to other thoughts for extended periods were better able to control their behavior.236 Self227
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control thus seems linked to the ability to focus on others than one’s self. Self-control is enabled
by sustained, focused attention, thus permitting long-term planning, information-gathering,
engagement with others in ways that enable connection.237 Social learning and caring thus turn
on uni-focusing. Science journalist Maggie Jackson makes the point eloquently:
Attention … tames our inner beast. Primates that receive
training in attention become less aggressive. One of attention’s highest
forms is “effortful control,” ... the ability to shift focus deliberately,
engage in planning, and regulate one’s impulses. Six-and-seven-yearolds who score high in tests of this skill are more empathetic, better
able to feel guilt and shame, and less aggressive. Moreover, effortful
control is integral to developing a conscience, researchers are
discovering. In order to put back the stolen cookie, you must attend to
your uneasy feelings, the action itself, and the abstract moral principles
– then make the right response. All in all, attention is key to both our
free will as individuals and our ability to subordinate ourselves to a
greater good.238
The multi-tasking, distracting, interruption-filled life of modernity does not keep citizens
practiced in this form of focused social attention. Perhaps that is why so many Americans, even
the young, may report many weak social ties but few strong ones.239 Yet without skill at
focused, particularly face-to-face, social attention, empathy suffers.240 There are surely many
other forces affecting whether we can empathize with another in a particular case,241 and the
immersion in concrete evidence at a criminal trial may arguably force jurors to pay closer
attention to the person they are judging.242 But most suspects will be racial minorities, class
minorities,243 portrayed as “them,” not “us” in the media,244 already creating obstacles to
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empathy and fear of the purported offender.245 Scattered attention spans may amplify the
problem. There is thus at least good reason to worry that news audiences for crime stories will
have every motivation to absorb those stories uncritically, to favor the negative ones portraying
the suspect in a bad light, and to avoid the effort to understand his life circumstances or to see the
other side. Those risks may not fully abate when some of those audiences members sit in his
judgment as jurors.246
D. Gossip, Rumors, and the Net
1. False Net Rumors and How They Spread
Remember that net users consider two sources of information extremely credible: people they
already know or sites that they frequently use with some emotional investment in them.247 This
observation matters greatly when we recognize that most news and opinion about it is spread by
rumor, defined here roughly as the spread of unverified information.248 In the pre-internet world,
friends, neighbors, and colleagues gossiped about much, including local crime stories. That, of
course, still happens. But the internet magnifies the speed and impact with which those rumors
can spread.249
Because rumors are unverified, it can be hard to separate the true wheat from the false
chaff.250 Rumor propagators have many motives, however, to spread false, misleading, or
incomplete information, consciously or not. Such motives include narrow self-interest (making
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money, beating the competition), general self-interest in the sense of attracting eyeballs to
websites, altruism (promoting a social cause), and malice (injuring another for the sheer joy of
it.)251 On the net, a rumor posted on a blog with even a small readership gets picked up by one
blog, then another, then another, until finally even making it to the local news.252 Rumors can
spread in similar fashion through social networking sites.253
Three effects in particular aid the spread of rumor. First, informational cascades.254 The idea
here is simply that you hear a rumor, have no personal knowledge of its accuracy, but you see
many other people propagating it. Accordingly, you assume that so many people cannot be
wrong, so you accept the rumor’s truth and spread it further.255 Even if you have some counterinformation, the sheer number of people accepting the rumor may cause you to lack confidence
in your initial judgments. You defer to the will of the group.256
Second, and relatedly, conformity cascades may arise.257 These are similar to informational
cascades but the primary motive is not doubt in the accuracy of one’s own knowledge base but
rather the desire to conform to a group.258 Experiments reveal that people will even express
belief in information whose accuracy they doubt to avoid feared social sanctions.259 Explains law
professor Cass Sunstein:
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Rumors often spread as a result of conformity cascades, which are
especially important in social networks made up of tightly knit groups
or in which there is a strong stake in a certain set of beliefs. In a
conformity cascade, people go along with the group in order to
maintain the good opinion of others – no matter their private views or
doubts.260
Thus if A and B are far-left liberals and A tells B that a well-known Republican Senator is
taking graft, B may profess belief in that rumor. She may do so even if she privately doubts its
truth because she wants to avoid A’s hostility or lessened esteem of her or that of her other farleft friends.261
Third, group polarization, discussed above, plays a role.262 Widespread discussion within a
group leads to more extreme versions of the originally-held beliefs. Social networks, including
via networking sites, magnify the effect because they increase corroboration by the like-minded
and heighten concerns about maintaining a strong reputation among other community
members.263 Polarization intensifies not only the cognitive strength of beliefs but also their
emotional importance to us, often leading to anger.264 Consequently, deliberation often prompts
aggressive protest action, even including supporting marches and sit-ins.265 Such action itself
enhances polarization while gaining still more attention for the initiating rumor.266
Different groups have different likelihoods of initially believing a rumor, primarily based
upon whether it is consistent or inconsistent with the group’s prior beliefs.267 Consistency with
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prior convictions promotes belief, inconsistency its opposite.268 One group thus has a low
threshold for believing a rumor, another a higher threshold.269 Yet if the low-threshold group is
big enough, and if other low-threshold groups catch on, eventually the total group may be large
enough for even higher threshold groups to accept the rumor’s truth and propagate it further.270
2. Raced Effects
Rumors that are consistent with pre-existing attitudes, including toward racial group
members, are more likely to be believed.271 For example, rumors about black criminality,
stupidity, and sexual aggression are more readily accepted by white audiences than the
converse.272 In the mid 1960s, a rumor circulated in Detroit, Michigan, falsely alleging that a
child was castrated by a gang of teenage boys in a shopping mall restroom. “When repeated in
the White community, the gang was said to be Black and the victim White. When told in the
Black community, the gang was said to be White and the victim Black.”273
Rumor-repetition also increases its acceptance. The mere re-telling of a similar story can thus
encourage its spread, particularly if not rebutted by equally credible sources.274 Likewise, the
various other biases recounted above that degrade rumor accuracy in the telling--informationfilters, confirmation biases, in-group aggrandizement, among others--probably promote
acceptance and repetition of stereotype-consistent rumors.275
In any given instance, of course, a variety of forces can be at work, some promoting rumor
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accuracy, others undermining it. But what this review of illustrative factors encouraging the
latter does is to point out how racial stereotyping can raise the risk of inaccurate rumors being
believed, particularly under certain conditions.276
3. Difficulties of Responding
More speech will not necessarily correct false net rumors. The joint presence of three factors
makes it particularly unlikely that counter-speech will change false beliefs: (1) strong prior
beliefs, (2) skewed trust toward the rumor source, and (3) weak prior knowledge.277 Many
audience members will have strong prior beliefs about crime, mostly ones that work against the
accused, as has been extensively demonstrated elsewhere.278 The media exaggeration of crime
frequency and severity to catch audience attention, explained earlier, creates a perception of our
society as a dangerous one populated by human-appearing predators.279 Racial stereotypes
trigger fears of offenders.280 Despite the presumption of innocence, too many people assume that
someone arrested must be guilty or dangerous, even if the innocence movement has made some
inroads into these attitudes.281 Crimes stories also help to create social solidarity in a rapidlychanging, oft-frightening world.282 The stories promote shared values and a common perceived
enemy.283
On the other hand, most of us have little prior knowledge about specific criminal cases. We
glean our knowledge from rumor, friends, websites, social networking sites, and media outlets.284
276
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We are unlikely to do independent investigation in most cases, and only the rare person had
eyewitness knowledge of the events in a specific case.285 Our ignorance makes it likely that we
will rely on trusted others.286
Rumors from friends or frequently-visited sites are treated as coming from trusted others.287
Website reports are too-readily accepted uncritically.288 Beliefs in rumor truth, including about
crime stories, will form early.289 Moreover, because law enforcement has access to most of the
information early in a case, even the true information available will tend to favor conviction.290
Beliefs once formed mightily resist change, even in the face of starkly contradicting evidence.
Indeed, audiences suspect that merely trying to rebut a story shows that you have something to
hide and that the prior-belief-inconsistent source is likely not credible.291 Self-deception,
rationalization, and filtering processes lead to judging the new evidence as implausible or
confused.292 Moreover, trying to rebut a prior belief simply re-focuses attention on that belief,
often perversely increasing the strength with which it is held.293 Only if special sets of
circumstances are present, such as the belief-inconsistent information itself coming from trusted
sources that first defended the initial belief, will counter-speech likely be effective.294
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Negative, vivid rumors are also more likely to spread and stay – to be “sticky” -- than are
positive, more abstract ones.295 Rumors triggering strong emotions, such as disgust, anger, or
outrage, spread more rapidly and resist counter-information more effectively than more pallid,
positive information.296 This too can contribute to selective perception of the disgusting and evil,
selective inattention to the opposite.297 The media is aware of this phenomenon, thus more likely
to spread the negative in the first place.298 But horribly vivid crime stories will mean that positive
messages will face selective inattention.299
Rumors need not be false to inflict grave harm. If the state truthfully summarizes information
it will present via the story as it sees it and the defense does the same, the state’s story under the
circumstances just noted will be stickier than the defense’s. An incomplete tale can be a
misleading one. Moreover, so much of what happens at trial is not about the evidence but about
its interpretation.300 It can be hard to label one interpretation “false,” another true.301 Yet the
same forces can skew average public perception of a reported criminal case in favor of one
interpretation over another well before a jury has been empanelled.302
4. Jurors and the Media
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The dominant view among research psychologists is that pretrial publicity has negative
effects, generally ones working against defendants.303 Persons exposed to media crime stories
tend toward pro-prosecution bias.304 Publicity conveying factually probative, incriminating
information, such as whether a defendant confessed, plays into this bias in a particular case.305
Emotional publicity casting the defendant in a bad light, though relevant to some issue other than
the wrongdoer’s identity, also favors conviction.306 Reports of a defendant’s bad character can do
much damage to audience fairness, especially revelations of a prior record, which foster
perceptions of the suspect as a “typical criminal.”307 Pretrial publicity has its greatest effect on
individuals lacking strong prejudgments about guilt in the individual case or strong case-relevant
attitudes (for example, about the likelihood of “real rape”) and when the prosecution’s case is
weak.308
Once negative reactions set in, new evidence tends to be viewed through a proprosecution lens.309 Field and laboratory research converge on similar results.310 However, a
“combination of prejudicial information – such as the seriousness of the offense, the race of the
accused, unfavorable statements by a prosecutor, a confession, and retention in custody – is more
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likely to result in a guilty verdict than any one item presented in isolation.”311 Pretrial publicity
increases juror recall of anti-defendant information, biases its interpretation against the defendant
still further, and enhances pre-existing negative attitudes, “for example, that fraternities promote
licentiousness.”312 The heinous nature of the crime, media focus on an individual defendant
rather than a class of defendants, and high credibility of the source – and on crime reports in
individual cases, the media may be given much credibility – are also factors favoring
conviction.313
The current Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”), of course, prohibit
prosecutors from conveying to the media several of the most damaging categories of pre-trial
information.314 Yet prosecutor compliance is erratic. Thus one content analysis of fourteen
newspapers revealed that twenty-seven percent of media-identified criminal suspects in news
stories revealed information violative of the MRPC prohibitions.315 This study concluded that the
“most common types of publicly revealed information were negative statements about the
suspect, prior arrest information, opinions of guilt, confessions, and prior conviction
information.”316 Although the media may obtain this information through many sources, the
311
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study revealed that “[l]aw enforcement officers and prosecutors were often the sources of
prejudicial information to the newspapers.”317 Another, more recent content analysis reached
similar conclusions but also explored racial bias.318 That study found that “African-Americans
and Latinos were twice as likely as Whites to be described in prejudicial ways that violated the
ABA standards.”319
There is a dispute about the size of the pretrial publicity effects. Pessimists find a great
effect size. Optimists see a much smaller effect size.320 Yet even the optimists’ reports of small
effect sizes can make a big difference in close cases. In such cases, juries that are just below the
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt threshold need their confidence in conviction raised only a bit to
cross over into the zone of conviction.321 Presumably very strong cases would result in
conviction even without bad publicity and very weak ones will not be revived from the dead by
publicity alone.322 If that presumption is correct, most such cases should result in guilty pleas
rather than trials. Pretrial publicity thus matters most in those cases worthy of debate and likely
to go to trial, even under the (contested) conclusions of the minority pessimists.
Pessimists and optimists also disagree over the likely success of remedies for pretrial
publicity. Pessimists, again in the majority, find most available remedies ineffective.323 Voir dire
does not work, partly because potential jurors may honestly but erroneously declare that they can
be fair.324 Persons are also often unaware of the effect of various factors on their tendency to
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convict. They do not know themselves.325 There is even some evidence that merely asking
potential jurors about pretrial biasing information can in fact heighten its biasing effects.326
Peremptory challenges run out quickly, leaving either side little effective remedy in voir dire.327
Jury instructions to disregard pretrial publicity are similarly generally ineffective.328 The
ineffectiveness can, however, perhaps be moderated by contextual factors, such as strong proprosecution evidence or giving jurors a persuasive, logical reason to believe the previouslyrevealed information to be unreliable.329 Some researchers believe that deliberation can reduce
the effects of inadmissible evidence within a juror’s awareness.330 Yet the more prevalent view is
that “deliberations actually tend to increase the effect of publicity on jurors,”331 probably again
because of group polarization.332 Moreover, the overwhelming consensus is one of general
distrust of admonitions as a means for combating pretrial publicity effects.333 Admonitions
likely fail because of belief perseverance (processing future information consistently with the
original belief), the backfire effect (paying more attention to what you are told to ignore),
hindsight bias (the inability, once being told of information, to alter one’s beliefs to what they
were before you were exposed to the information), and reactance (giving more weight to what
you are told to ignore because of resentment at an effort to limit your autonomy).334
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Researchers disagree on the effects of long continuances. There is some reason to believe
that the press moderates its reports over a long time period.335 There is also research suggesting
that the impact on the public diminishes over time.336 But there is contrary evidence that the
impact increases with time.337
Change of venue can be difficult and works only if press coverage did not reach the new
venue.338 That seems increasingly less likely in a world where internet communication can
spread stories rapidly around the globe.339
Optimists disagree concerning remedy effectiveness in one way. The optimists point out
that most studies examined the impact of remedies one at a time.340 Optimists instead embrace
the “cumulative remedies hypothesis,” that is, that “careful voir dire, effective defense counsel,
cautionary instructions, jury deliberation, and presentation of trial-evidence under real-world
conditions should cumulatively minimize or even entirely erase media coverage’s negative
effects.”341 Yet pessimists concede that their argument rests partly on improvements in how each
of these remedies are currently administered, improvements that would seem unlikely to be
rapidly adopted.342 In any event, the combination of all these remedies in the real world seems a
lot to ask for (guaranteeing effective defense counsel in an under-resourced criminal justice
system is alone a challenge).343 Moreover, the wisdom of the optimists’ assertion awaits further
research.344
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The bottom line is that jury research is consistent with the likely ill impacts of pretrial
publicity discussed throughout this piece. The net-related-effects described in earlier sections of
this article suggest that pretrial publicity effects will worsen, not improve, as younger
generations age and technology advances. The only sure-fire way to protect against the ill effects
of pretrial publicity on criminal trials is to bar it entirely, a non-starter in our constitutional
culture.345
IV. Conclusion
There is much to like in the new standard on prosecutors’ dealing with the media. I have
written elsewhere on the need for current standards to address the risks of harm to reputation, not
only to a fair trial.346 The new standard does just that.347 Prosecutors must therefore be cautious
with the press even for cases that are ultimately dismissed or result in guilty pleas, and even
where a fair trial seems possible but certain information-dissemination creates risks of
unnecessarily harming reputation, including harming it more than would (and before) the simple
fact of conviction itself. Although both the old and the new core standard protect not only the
fairness of trials but of “criminal proceedings,”348 thus also arguably extending to guilty pleas,
the new standard more properly and more broadly adds a focus not only on prejudice to such
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proceedings but to undue (“unnecessary”) harm to reputation (or, in the standard’s words, to
heightened “public condemnation”) and is thus to be applauded.349
The new standard also has other provisions that discourage continuation of prosecution
contact with the media “off the record” or even where the prosecutor is not involved in the
particular high-profile case on which she comments if that improperly risks an unfair trial or
otherwise risks materially prejudicing a criminal proceeding.350 That discourages end-runs
around the core provision guarding the right to a fair trial.351 Similarly, there are new provisions
generally barring prosecutors from emotion-heightening demonstrations or re-creations for the
media of any pending case, including ones in which the prosecutor is not directly involved.352
Nor may the prosecutor allow her judgment to be influenced by the personal or career benefits of
involving the media.353 These provisions offer details that improve upon the current standard’s
textual silence on these matters.
But the standard’s core provision protecting the right to a fair trial (and other stages of a
criminal proceeding), on which I have focused here, is troubling. One minor point is that it does
not define “prejudice” to a criminal proceeding. In the sixth amendment effective assistance of
counsel area, prejudice means either likely to alter the case outcome or to undermine confidence
in the outcome.354 That seems like a sensible standard and, if applied here, would negate any
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need to talk of “material” prejudice. Although commentary may clear up the matter, I cannot see
what point the addition of the materiality language to the existing rule serves other than as a
signal that it should be harder to find prejudice than is the case under the current rule.
The more important problem, however, is not with the materiality or prejudice language
but with the retention of the core standard barring prosecutor statements raising a “substantial
likelihood” of materially prejudicing a criminal proceeding. What I have argued here is that there
is strong reason to worry that any press coverage of a high-profile case raises a substantial risk of
such prejudice. Furthermore, I have insisted that this risk is likely to rise in the future because of
quickening technological and resulting cultural change. Specifically, our high-informationoverload, multi-tasking lifestyle encourages decision making by the general public based more
on emotion than reason. Moreover, computer technology, with all its many advantages,
discourages deep, sustained, critical thinking unless there is a strong motivation to do so or the
audience receives special training in doing so, both unlikely to occur with the audience in most
high-profile cases.
That same technology, though this point is more speculative, may be reducing the ease
with which most people are able to experience empathy, yet empathy is a cognitive prerequisite
to accurately and fairly judging another. You must in particular understand another person’s
nature and situation before you can make such value-laden, interpretive judgments as defining
what his mental state was at the time of the crime.355 Additionally, the web’s speed and breadth
exacerbate the many dangers that rumor-mongering poses to trial fairness. Yet news always
spreads, and faces reinterpretation by, the rumor-dissemination process. Finally, research on the
impact of pretrial publicity on trial fairness seems consistent with the dangers noted here.
Granted, some forms of publicity are more dangerous than others. But even such facts as the race
355
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of the suspects, the neighborhoods from which they hail, and other matters not specifically
prohibited by the standards, new or proposed, or even prohibited by current ABA ethics
disciplinary rules, can pose substantial risks to trial fairness.356
Yet, despite these concerns, this flawed standard may, as a practical matter, be as good as
it can get. Notably, the United States offers capacious free speech protection far beyond that of
most other nations, even when the right to a fair trial is involved.357 Even if the Court sometimes
writes as if it is finding no substantial danger to trial fairness from pre-trial publicity in particular
cases, its cases are more sensibly understood as implicitly (or sometimes explicitly) balancing
free speech rights against trial rights.358 Such balancing is more of a normative question than a
factual one, though “facts” like the risk posed to a fair trial certainly should enter the balance.
But the ultimately normative nature of the inquiry means that the risks posed by technology
cannot justify a flat bar on prosecutors contributing to the risk posed by the press to fair trial
rights. Words like “substantial” in the standard might indeed best be understood as meaning
“substantial next to the need for protecting free speech and press rights,” in short, as implying a
balancing.359
Additionally, it is not only the constitution but sound policy that favors protecting press
coverage of the criminal justice system, despite some risk posed to trial fairness. The public in a
democracy has a right to know how the system works, and the purposes of the criminal law (for
example, retribution, public education) cannot fully be served if the public is not aware of system
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processes and outcomes.360 The media may itself distort the message, but it is far too dangerous
to let the state decide that matter on its own. Although prosecutors are far from the only available
information sources, they are important information sources. Cutting off media access to them
entirely seems extreme.
Furthermore, it is plausible that prosecutors need media access to promote trial fairness to
the state or to justice. There may be a need to respond to defense use of the media.361
Alternatively, the press may on its own be painting an unfair picture of events, or the public may
harbor biases that prosecutor statements may at least arguably be capable of softening.362
Do not misunderstand me. In an ideal world, when the analysis above is weighed against
free speech rights, even better approaches than those recited in the proposed standards are
defensible, as I have argued elsewhere.363 Such alternatives would, for example, adopt a
principle of non-aggravation – that a prosecutor should make no statement that aggravates the
unfair prejudice inherent in any media coverage.364 Likewise, each prosecutor would avoid
certain categories of particularly damaging revelations to the press – likely damage determined
by social science -- and would even work affirmatively to counter unfair prejudices created by
the media alone.365 But my experience in participating in roundtables on the proposed standards
at various locations around the country and in various criminal justice law reform efforts in other
areas suggests that the current proposed standards may the best that the politics of our time will
allow.
The best solution available beyond the text of these standards, therefore, seems to be
improved prosecutor training, heightening prosecutor aspirations, and building systems of
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transparency and accountability for prosecutors’ use of the media that fall short of the chilling
effects of harsh bar discipline, which experience has shown is unlikely to be forthcoming
anyway.366 The prosecution standards can further these goals by expanding at least the
commentary, if not the text itself, to caution against the dangers noted here, to further caution
prosecutors to be conservative in deciding what to tell the press, to offer some useful
hypotheticals, and to emphasize the importance of training and accountability procedures, both
internal and external.367 The ABA is also currently working on revising the Fair Press/Free Trial
standards, and that may be the appropriate place to take the more ambitious step of
recommending procedural changes in how prosecutors’ offices can improve training,
transparency, and accountability in this area. This brief piece is not the place to suggest specifics,
though numerous writers have been addressing prosecutor best practices in internal management
and external review in other areas that may serve as inspiration.368
Ultimately, therefore, I conclude that the proposed prosecution media standards do nearly
as fine a job as can be expected, but they cannot alone be expected to do enough. At a minimum,
however, later forthcoming commentary to the proposed standards should take into the account
the matters analyzed here and should try to get the ball rolling for other-needed mechanisms for
reform. The prosecutors’ duty to “do justice”369 demands no less.
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